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7PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases
The Criminal Law Docket: A Term of Modest Changes
by Alan Raphael 
The Supreme Court’s most significant decisions regarding criminal 
procedure in the current term concerned double jeopardy, the bar 
on racial discrimination in jury selection, the excessive fines clause 
of the Eighth Amendment, and the right to counsel on appeal. Most 
of this article discusses the first two of those decisions. The Court 
decided only one case regarding the Fourth Amendment prohibition 
on unreasonable searches and seizures, and none interpreting the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendment restrictions on admission of confessions 
against defendants.
Double Jeopardy
In United States v. Gamble, 588 U.S. ___ (2019), the Court 
reaffirmed the dual-sovereigns (or separate-sovereigns) exception 
to the Double Jeopardy Clause. The double jeopardy doctrine 
announced in the Fifth Amendment prohibits a second prosecution 
of a defendant for the same offense. Under the dual-sovereigns 
exception, double jeopardy does 
not bar successive prosecutions 
by different governments, federal 
or state. Neither a state nor the 
federal government may prosecute 
or punish a defendant a second 
time for the same offense. A 
prosecution in a federal court does 
not bar the bringing of charges in 
a state court; similarly, a prosecution in a state court does not bar 
the bringing of charges or imposition of punishment subsequently 
in a federal court or in another state court. 
Terence Martin Gamble was convicted of felony second-degree 
robbery in Mobile County, Alabama, in 2008 and two domestic 
violence charges in 2013. Under both Alabama and federal law, it 
is a crime for a convicted felon to possess a firearm. While driving 
his vehicle in 2015, Gamble was lawfully stopped for a traffic 
violation, and a lawful search turned up a weapon, marijuana, and 
a digital scale. Charged under Alabama law with being a felon in 
possession of a weapon, Ala. Code 12-25-32(15), Gamble pleaded 
guilty, was convicted, and served one year in prison. While the state 
prosecution was proceeding, the United States charged Gamble 
with violating the federal law prohibiting a felon from possessing 
a weapon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), based on the same weapon which 
led to the state charges. Prior to seeking the federal indictment, 
the federal prosecutor in Alabama obtained permission from the 
Department of Justice to bring the charge as being consistent with 
the Petite Policy, which allows federal prosecutions following state 
prosecutions in specified circumstances.
Gamble moved to dismiss the federal charge as violating his Fifth 
Amendment right against being twice placed in jeopardy for the 
same crime. The district court denied his motion on the basis of 
the separate-sovereigns exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause, 
which the Supreme Court has recognized as allowing successive 
prosecutions by separate sovereigns, such as the federal and state 
governments, even though the subsequent charge would be barred 
if both were brought by the same government. Gamble entered a 
plea to the federal charge, was convicted, and received a 46-month 
sentence, to be served concurrently with the state sentence. The 
total time served by Gamble was the amount he would have served 
had he been convicted only in federal court. 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit affirmed the conviction in an unpublished ruling. It 
reasoned: “The Supreme Court has determined that prosecution 
in federal and state court for the same conduct does not violate the 
Double Jeopardy Clause because the state and federal governments 
are separate sovereigns.” The appellate court’s ruling cited as 
authority Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959), which first 
clearly announced the exception, 
Eleventh Circuit cases from 1979 
and 2004, which applied Abbate, 
and the most recent Supreme 
Court case applying it, Puerto 
Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 
1863 (2016). In Sanchez Valle, 
two concurring justices, Justices 
Clarence Thomas and Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, urged the Supreme Court to reconsider whether there 
should be a separate-sovereigns exception to the double jeopardy 
rules. 
The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari in Gamble’s case 
to decide whether to follow or overrule the separate-sovereigns 
exception. By a 7–2 vote, the Court reaffirmed that the separate-
sovereigns rule is consistent with the text, history, and intent of 
the Double Jeopardy Clause and thus found no reason to reverse 
Gamble’s conviction. Justice Samuel Alito wrote the opinion for the 
Court, and Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a concurring opinion. 
Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Neil Gorsuch dissented. All the 
justices focused on two issues: 1) the intent of the framers of the 
clause and early 19th century treatises and precedents and 2) the 
question of when it is appropriate for the Court to reverse existing 
precedents. 
Gamble argued that two developments since Abbate, when the 
Supreme Court last addressed the issue of the separate-sovereigns 
exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause in 1949, eroded the Court’s 
basis for the ruling. First, Abbate was decided in 1949, years before 
the Double Jeopardy Clause was held to apply to the states by 
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). Second, in the last half 
century, the scope of federal criminal law has increased greatly so 
that instances of overlapping state and federal jurisdiction are much 
more common, and thus possible instances of dual prosecutions for 
the same offense are much greater than had formerly been true. 
All the justices in Gamble focused on two issues:  
1) the intent of the framers of the clause and early 
19th century treatises and precedents and  
2) the question of when it is appropriate for the 
Court to reverse existing precedents. 
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As to the first, the Court stated that incorporation of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause as applied to the states included all aspects of the 
jurisprudence regarding the clause, including the dual-sovereigns 
exception. As to the second, the Court acknowledged the increased 
possibility of federal and state prosecutions for the same offense but 
saw the development as harmful only if the dual-sovereigns doctrine 
is legal error. Because the Court found no error in applying the dual-
sovereigns rule, the possibly greater frequency of dual prosecutions 
does not provide any reason to abandon the doctrine. 
The Court concluded that the historical evidence asserted by Gamble 
was “feeble” and that the text of the Clause, historical evidence, 
and 170 years of precedent justified retaining the rule allowing 
successive prosecutions for the same offense by different sovereigns.
In her Gamble dissent, Justice Ginsburg rejected the view that the 
federal and state governments are separate sovereigns and would 
have overruled the Court’s decisions regarding the dual-sovereigns 
exception. In her view, incorporation of the Double Jeopardy Clause 
as a protection against state governments meant that, like the 
federal government, states could not prosecute a person twice for 
the same offense. She saw no reason “why each of two governments 
within the United States should be permitted to try a person once 
for the same offense when neither could try him or her twice.” 
Further, Justice Ginsburg viewed 
the expansion of federal criminal 
law as increasing the likelihood 
of dual prosecutions for the 
same offense, which would have 
been rare when federal criminal 
law’s scope was more limited. 
She pointed out that Gamble’s 
case was not an unusual or 
extraordinary one but, instead, a 
run-of-the-mill felon-in-possession charge. 
What is probably more important than the fate of Gamble’s 
conviction or the retention of the dual-sovereigns rule are the 
justices’ differing views on the question of when the Court should 
follow existing precedent and when the Court should be willing to 
overturn well-established Court rulings. In the current term, the 
Court reversed long-established decisions in two cases, Franchise 
Tax Board of Cal. v. Hyatt, 587 U.S. _____ (2019), and Knick v. 
Township of Scott, 588 U.S. ____ (2019). The Supreme Court has 
been closely divided on numerous constitutional issues in recent 
years, and recent appointments to the Court have altered that 
balance so the majority may now favor positions on numerous 
issues previously articulated by dissenting opinions. The willingness 
of justices to overturn precedents may be crucial in determining 
constitutional law in numerous areas, such as abortion, affirmative 
action, deference to administrative agencies, death penalty 
jurisprudence, racial and political gerrymandering, rights of gay 
people, determinations of what unenumerated rights are protected 
by the federal constitution, and the scope of the Commerce Clause. 
In Hyatt, dissenting Justice Stephen Breyer wrote of the dangers of 
reversing legal course “only because five Members of a later Court” 
decide that an earlier ruling was incorrect. He then concluded: 
“Today’s decision can only cause one to wonder which cases the 
Court will overrule next.” In Knick, dissenting Justice Elena Kagan 
quoted Breyer’s words in Hyatt a month earlier and observed: “Well, 
that did not take long. Now one may wonder yet again.”
The Alito majority opinion in Gamble concluded that Gamble 
had failed to show that the exception was inconsistent with the 
original understanding of the Double Jeopardy Clause or that 
there was a good reason to reject the principle of stare decisis, the 
application of existing precedent. The Court recognized that stare 
decisis “promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent 
development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial 
decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity 
of the judicial process” (quoting from Payne v. Tennessee, 501 
U.S. 808 (1991)). Although recognizing that stare decisis is less 
binding in constitutional adjudication when compared to statutory 
interpretation because in the former Congress cannot overturn 
decisions by ordinary legislation, the Court held that “even in 
constitutional cases, a departure from precedent ‘demands special 
justification.’”
In his concurring opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas concluded 
that his initial skepticism about the dual-sovereigns doctrine was 
not supported by the historical record. His concurrence expressed 
a very different view of the role of stare decisis in constitutional 
adjudication than that expressed 
by the Court in this case. He 
asserts that the Court should 
decide constitutional issues 
“through adherence to the 
correct, original meaning of 
the laws we are charged with 
applying.” For any decision 
that was “demonstrably 
erroneous—one that is not a 
permissible interpretation of the text—the Court should correct 
the error, regardless of whether other factors support overruling 
the precedent.” Thus, the majority’s consideration of stability of 
the law, preservation of reliance interests, or judicial humility, 
in Justice Thomas’s view, improperly interfere with the duty to 
decide based on the original understanding of the constitutional 
provision. According to Justice Thomas, precedent may be relevant 
when it is not demonstrably erroneous, “when there is room for 
honest disagreement.” Applying those tests in this case led Justice 
Thomas to concur with the Court’s decision, concluding that “I am 
not persuaded that our precedent is incorrect as an original matter, 
much less demonstrably erroneous.”
Dissenting in Gamble, Justice Gorsuch asserted that “the 
[constitutional] text, principles of federalism, and history” 
demonstrate that the dual-sovereigns doctrine should be abandoned. 
Justice Gorsuch noted that the Court has always taken care in 
applying stare decisis in constitutional decisions because judges 
swear to protect and defend the Constitution. He pointed out that 
“blind obedience to stare decisis should leave this Court still abiding 
grotesque errors like Dred Scott v. Sandford, Plessy v. Ferguson, and 
Korematsu v. United States.” Unlike Justice Thomas, Justice Gorsuch 
asserted that whether to apply stare decisis requires consideration 
of various factors—“the quality of the decision’s reasoning, its 
consistency with related decisions, legal developments since the 
What is probably more important than the fate of 
Gamble’s conviction or the retention of the dual-
sovereigns rule are the justices’ differing views on 
the question of when the Court should follow 
existing precedent and when the Court should be 
willing to overturn well-established Court rulings.
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decision, and reliance on the decision.” He then applied each of 
these factors and concluded they supported an overruling of the 
separate-sovereigns exception.
Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection
In another case that received a great deal of popular attention 
because of a much-publicized podcast, the Court in Flowers v. 
Mississippi, 588 U.S. ___ (2019), reversed the convictions and death 
sentence of Curtis Giovanni Flowers for four murders in 1996 at a 
furniture company in Winona, Mississippi. The Court concluded 
that the prosecutor had engaged in racial discrimination by the 
use of peremptory challenges during jury selection in the trial. The 
prosecutor in the case was white, the African-American defendant 
had faced six trials for murder. The Supreme Court’s reversal of 
the conviction does not prevent the state from trying him again. 
Although the opinion strongly reiterated that courts must vigorously 
prevent racial discrimination in jury selection, the Flowers Court 
made clear that it was making no new law and that the facts of the 
case were so unusual that the 
decision has little precedential 
value.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees 
criminal defendants the right 
to a jury trial in criminal cases, 
applicable to state trials through 
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, Duncan v. 
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). To select a jury, a random venire 
of prospective jurors is summoned. The potential jurors fill out 
questionnaires, and both parties and/or the court ask further 
questions to determine their fitness to serve on the jury. Then 
either party may challenge venire members for bias or other cause, 
and attorneys may strike a set number of them by peremptory 
challenges. A party usually does not have to disclose its reasons for 
exercising peremptory challenges. In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 
(1986), the Supreme Court ruled that equal protection is violated by 
the exercise of peremptory challenges used intentionally for racially 
discriminatory purposes. Although Batson involved the actions of 
a prosecutor, subsequent decisions have extended its reach to all 
trials, civil or criminal, and all parties, and have also barred use of 
peremptory challenges for intentional gender discrimination. 
To determine whether Batson has been violated, courts apply a 
three-part test. A party arguing that peremptory challenges were 
employed discriminatorily has the burden to prove a prima facie 
case of discrimination. If that standard is met, the court orders the 
party who used the challenges to provide nondiscriminatory reasons 
for each peremptory. The burden then shifts back to the objecting 
party to convince the court that purposeful discrimination has been 
shown. If the trial court determines that even one prospective juror 
was removed with discriminatory intent, then the defendant has 
met his burden of persuasion under Batson. In reviewing a Batson 
challenge, the appellate court must show deference to the trial 
court’s reasoning and will reverse only if it finds that the decision 
was clearly erroneous. 
Initially, the prosecution tried Flowers for two of the murders 
in separate trials. During jury selection in the second trial, the 
judge found that the prosecutor had committed a Batson violation 
in removing one person from the jury and reinstated the juror 
to the panel. Both those trials resulted in convictions, but both 
convictions were reversed because of numerous instances of 
prosecutorial misconduct. Flowers’s subsequent trials were for all 
four killings. At the third trial, the judge rejected a Batson claim of 
racial discrimination. On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court 
reversed the conviction after finding Batson violations regarding 
the challenges to two potential jurors. The Mississippi Supreme 
Court indicated that the prosecutor’s actions demonstrated the most 
egregious instance of a prima facie case of discrimination that it 
had seen. The next two trials resulted in mistrials because the juries 
could not reach unanimous verdicts. 
The case before the Supreme Court involved the sixth trial. The 
same prosecutor acted for Mississippi in all six trials. The venire 
consisted of 26 people. There were 6 African-American venire 
persons; the prosecutor challenged 5 and allowed 1 to serve on the 
jury. Flowers challenged each of the strikes; the trial court found 
a prima facie showing of racial discrimination and ordered the 
prosecutor to present race-neutral 
justifications for the peremptory 
challenges. The prosecutor did 
so, and the trial court found 
that Flowers had failed to meet 
his burden of showing that the 
challenges were intentionally 
racially discriminatory. Flowers was convicted and sentenced to 
death. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, 
rejecting the Batson claim. After remand from the United States 
Supreme Court for reconsideration, the state supreme court again 
affirmed by a narrow margin. 
In ruling for Flowers on this appeal, the Supreme Court, in an 
opinion by Justice Brett Kavanaugh, found that the totality of the 
circumstances demonstrated that the trial court erred in denying 
the Batson claim. The Court concluded that four facts led to this 
conclusion. First, the state in the repeated trials used its peremptory 
challenges to remove 41 of the 42 black prospective jurors it could 
have struck. (Data is lacking regarding the fifth trial, so these 
statistics include only the first four trials and the present, sixth, 
trial.) Second, the prosecutor removed 5 of the 6 potential jurors in 
the sixth trial. Third, in questioning potential jurors, the prosecutor 
asked far more questions of the black jurors before striking them 
compared to the white jurors who were not struck; the Court 
saw this disparity in questioning as an apparent attempt to find 
pretextual reasons to strike black prospective jurors. Fourth, the 
state’s expressed reasons for striking one juror, Carolyn Wright, 
were equally relevant to a white juror who was not challenged. 
She was the only juror whose strike was found to be intentionally 
discriminatory. The Supreme Court opinion stated clearly that it was 
not deciding that any one of these four facts alone would require 
reversal of the conviction. Rather, it concluded that “all the relevant 
facts and circumstances taken together establish that the trial court 
committed clear error in concluding that the State’s peremptory 
strike of black prospective juror Carolyn Wright was not ‘motivated in 
substantial part by discriminatory intent.’” The Court clearly stated 
that “we break no new legal ground. We simply enforce and reinforce 
Batson by applying it to the extraordinary facts of this case.”
The Mississippi Supreme Court indicated that the 
Flowers prosecutor’s actions demonstrated the 
most egregious instance of a prima facie case of 
discrimination that it had seen.
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Obviously, this decision is important to Flowers, whose four murder 
convictions and death sentence have been struck down. The state 
is free to retry Flowers again. The Court did not bar the same 
prosecutor from bringing the prosecution of Flowers or requiring 
the trial to be held in another county, although either would, if the 
next trial resulted in a conviction and a Batson claim were made, 
weaken the argument that there is a pattern of discrimination by 
the prosecutor in the numerous trials. 
When the Supreme Court decided Batson, Justice Thurgood 
Marshall concurred. He applauded the Court for announcing that 
racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges violates the 
Equal Protection Clause and for reversing contrary precedent. 
Nevertheless, Justice Marshall also indicated a belief that Batson 
would not eliminate impermissible racial discrimination and argued 
that the only remedy to do so was ending the practice of peremptory 
challenges entirely. Some critics of Batson believe that Justice 
Marshall was correct in his doubts about the effectiveness of the 
remedy the Court provided. Because the second step in Batson, 
requiring the challenged party to offer a nondiscriminatory reason 
for the challenge, is easily met, and because of the deference given 
by appellate courts to the determinations made by trial courts as to 
the third step in Batson, the procedures 
in fact often allow the continued use 
of peremptory challenges for racial 
or gender discrimination despite the 
decision’s strong condemnation of the 
biased use of peremptory challenges.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to 
counsel and includes the right to “effective assistance of counsel.” 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In Strickland, the 
Court held that ineffective assistance of counsel was determined by 
applying a two-part test: first, a defendant must demonstrate that 
counsel’s performance was deficient; and second, a defendant must 
show that the deficient performance was prejudicial to his case. The 
Strickland requirement applies to trials as well as appeals. 
In Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000), the Court held that 
prejudice would be presumed, and thus need not be demonstrated, 
when an attorney’s deficient performance denied the defendant 
an appeal he otherwise would have pursued. This year, in Garza 
v. Idaho, 586 U.S. _____ (2019), the Supreme Court held that the 
presumption of prejudice recognized in Flores-Ortega applies when 
a defendant signs a waiver of appeal in the course of pleading guilty 
but then insists on filing an appeal, which his attorney fails to do. 
In 2015, Gilberto Garza Jr. entered into two plea agreements arising 
from criminal charges brought by the state of Idaho. The agreements 
each contained a clause stating that Garza waived his right to appeal. 
Shortly after he was sentenced, Garza informed his trial counsel that 
he wished to appeal. According to Garza, he repeatedly attempted to 
notify counsel of his request, and the attorney later stated that he 
was aware of Garza’s wish to appeal. Nevertheless, counsel did not 
file a notice of appeal and informed Garza, after the time for filing an 
appeal had passed, that his appeals would be “problematic” because 
of the waiver clause contained in the plea agreements. 
Four months after being sentenced, Garza sought post-conviction 
relief in Idaho state court, alleging his attorney’s ineffective 
assistance of counsel for failing to file a notice of appeal despite 
Garza’s repeated requests. The Idaho trial court denied relief, and 
the Idaho Court of Appeals and the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed 
the decision. The Idaho Supreme Court held that Garza could not 
show deficient performance by counsel and the resulting prejudice, 
as required by Strickland. The Idaho court concluded that the 
presumption of prejudice recognized in Flores-Ortega does not 
apply when the defendant has agreed to an appeal waiver. In a 6–3 
decision, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that Flores-Ortega’s 
presumption of prejudice for failing to file an appeal as sought by 
the client applies regardless of whether the defendant has signed an 
appeal waiver.
The Garza Court explained that “no appeal waiver serves as an 
absolute bar to appellate claims.” Some waiver clauses may leave 
certain claims unwaived, and some claims cannot be waived. Thus, 
an attorney’s refusal to follow the client’s direction to file an appeal 
is always prejudicial. According to the Court in Flores-Ortega, filing 
a notice of appeal is a “purely ministerial task.” Ultimately, the 
decision to take an appeal is the defendant’s choice to make alone. 
Excessive Fines Clause
In Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U.S. ____ 
(2019), the Court held that the Eighth 
Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause 
is applicable to the states under the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Under the Eighth 
Amendment, “excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” The 
Excessive Fines Clause, the Court reasoned, is a safeguard for 
defendants against abuses of the government’s power to punish. 
After pleading guilty in Indiana state court to dealing in a 
controlled substance and conspiracy to commit theft, Tyson Timbs 
was sentenced to one year of home detention and five years of 
probation, including a requirement for Timbs to participate in 
a substance abuse treatment program. Additionally, Timbs was 
required to pay fees and costs totaling $1,203. The state then 
brought a civil suit for forfeiture of Timbs’s Land Rover, charging 
that the vehicle was used to transport heroin. The vehicle, which 
Timbs had recently purchased for $42,000 using money from 
insurance proceeds and not from drug sales, was seized at the 
time of Timbs’s arrest. 
Although the trial court found that the vehicle had been used to 
transport heroin, it denied the forfeiture because the purchase 
price of the vehicle was more than four times the maximum $10,000 
monetary fine that could have been assessed against Timbs in his 
criminal case. Because of this disproportionality, the trial court 
determined that the forfeiture was unconstitutional under the 
Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause. The Court of Appeals 
of Indiana affirmed the trial court’s determination, but the Indiana 
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Excessive Fines Clause is 
applicable only to federal action, but not to state action. The Indiana 
Supreme Court did not decide the question of whether the forfeiture 
in this case was excessive.
Ultimately, as Garza shows, the decision  
to take an appeal is the defendant’s 
choice to make alone.
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The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to decide whether 
the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause is applicable to the 
states under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
In a 9–0 vote, the Court reversed the Indiana Supreme Court’s 
decision and held that the Excessive Fines Clause is incorporated by 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg wrote for the Court, and Justices Clarence Thomas 
and Neil Gorsuch wrote concurring opinions. The concurring 
justices agreed as to the result, but would find the incorporation 
under the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause 
rather than under the Due Process Clause. 
The Court’s opinion focused on the history of incorporating Bill 
of Rights protections to the states, as well as the application of 
the Excessive Fines Clause to state civil in rem forfeitures (the 
forfeiture of property used in the commission of an offense). 
Justice Ginsburg noted that the history of the Clause dated back 
to the Magna Carta and that, at the time of the ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 35 of the 37 states expressly prohibited 
excessive fines. The protections found in the Bill of Rights are 
enforceable against state action under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
Justice Ginsburg explained, if the protection is “fundamental to 
our scheme of ordered liberty” 
or “deeply rooted in this Nation’s 
history and tradition.” McDonald v. 
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). The 
Court found those tests met and 
thus concluded that the Indiana 
Supreme Court erred in holding 
that the Clause did not apply to the 
state court’s forfeiture of Timbs’s 
vehicle. 
Indiana argued that the Excessive Fines Clause “does not apply to 
its use of civil in rem forfeitures because…the Clause’s specific 
application to such forfeitures is neither fundamental nor deeply 
rooted.” In responding to this argument, the Court reiterated its 
opinion in Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993), which held 
that civil in rem forfeitures are fines that fall within the protection 
of the Excessive Fines Clause when they are at least partially 
punitive. To succeed in its argument, the Court contended, the 
state would have to convince the Court to overrule Austin, or to hold 
that the Excessive Fines Clause is not incorporated because its 
application to civil in rem forfeitures is neither “fundamental nor 
deeply rooted.”
The Supreme Court refused to consider the question of whether the 
Court should overrule Austin because the state did not make that 
argument in the Indiana Supreme Court. In the Indiana Supreme 
Court, the state had argued that the forfeiture of Timbs’s SUV 
was not excessive; that court in no way addressed the Clause’s 
application to civil in rem forfeitures. Thus, the Court declined to 
reconsider Austin or to decide whether civil in rem forfeitures are 
fines for purposes of the Eighth Amendment when they are partially 
punitive. 
Indiana’s final argument posited that application of the Excessive 
Fines Clause to the states cannot be incorporated even if it does 
apply to civil in rem forfeitures. The Court reasoned that, once a Bill 
of Rights protection is incorporated, there is no difference between 
application of that right to conduct by the federal government 
and conduct by the states. It acknowledged one exception to this 
rule, in Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), which held that 
jury unanimity is required in federal, but not state, criminal 
proceedings, but indicated that the exception reflected an unusual 
judicial disagreement and it is unclear if the Court would continue 
or overrule that exception if it were challenged.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the Indiana decision and 
remanded the case for further proceedings. 
Searches and Seizures
For the third time in recent years, the Court addressed warrantless 
searches for blood alcohol concentration (BAC) in the bodies of 
allegedly impaired drivers, in Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 588 U.S. ___ 
(2019). The Fourth Amendment has two clauses, one setting the 
requirements for issuance of warrants by judges and one prohibiting 
unreasonable searches and seizures. Warrants are not always 
required, but there is a preference for having judicial authorization 
before a police officer carries out a search or seizure. In numerous 
circumstances, court decisions have approved exceptions to the 
warrant procedure, finding good reason for dispensing with a 
warrant and declaring the 
searches to be reasonable.
In Schmerber v. California, 
384 U.S. 757 (1966), the Court 
recognized that forcing people 
to have blood taken from their 
body is a search, but upheld the 
warrantless blood draw of an 
apparently intoxicated driver involved in an automobile accident 
as reasonable under the exigent, or emergency, circumstances 
exception to the warrant requirement. The presence of alcohol 
in blood diminishes once the person stops drinking, so the Court 
concluded it is important to have the test done quickly in order to 
obtain a proper reading to be used in evidence.
In Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013), the Supreme Court 
clarified that Schmerber did not hold that all nonconsensual blood 
tests were allowed in evidence without warrants but rather that the 
further delays caused by police dealing with an automobile accident, 
combined with the natural decrease over time in BAC, created an 
exigent circumstance allowing the warrantless search.
Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. ___ (2016), applied the search 
incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement to justify 
warrantless breath tests of persons arrested for drunk driving 
but not warrantless blood tests, because the breath tests are less 
intrusive, equally trustworthy, and readily able to be performed. This 
term, the Court addressed whether a warrantless blood test should 
be allowed to be admitted in evidence when the person in custody 
was unconscious or otherwise physically unable to participate in the 
breath test.
Like all states, Wisconsin law provides that a driver, by obtaining 
a license, has given implied consent to submit to a BAC test when 
there is probable cause to believe that the person was driving while 
impaired by alcohol. Although drivers can withdraw the consent 
The protections found in the Bill of Rights are 
enforceable against state action under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Ginsburg explained 
in Timbs, if the protection is “fundamental to  
our scheme of ordered liberty” or “deeply rooted  
in this Nation’s history and tradition.”
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and refuse the test, their license may then be revoked and their 
refusal used against them in court to show that they were driving 
over the legal alcohol limit. Gerald Mitchell was stopped lawfully 
while driving and arrested for driving while intoxicated. Police took 
him to the station for the breath test, but he was too lethargic to 
perform the test and then became 
unconscious. He was taken to 
the hospital, whose personnel 
performed a blood test on him while 
he was unconscious. His BAC was 
substantially over the legal limit. 
His conviction on the drunk driving 
charges was affirmed by the state 
courts on two grounds: first, that 
the implied consent laws mean that Mitchell consented to the blood 
test, thus satisfying the Fourth Amendment, and second, that it is 
reasonable to perform a warrantless blood test on an unconscious 
person because the less intrusive breath test is not available.
Most of the briefing and argument before the Supreme Court 
concerned whether implied consent laws indicated consent to taking 
the BAC test, but the Court did not decide that question. Instead, it 
concluded that Mitchell’s inability to undergo the breath test due 
to his lethargy and unconsciousness, combined with the natural 
diminution of alcohol in his blood over time, almost certainly 
created an exigent circumstance that justified performing the BAC 
test without a judge first issuing a warrant for it. The exigency was 
established because the officer could reasonably believe that the 
delay necessary to obtain a warrant threatened the destruction of 
the blood content evidence of driving while intoxicated. The Court 
recognized that in unusual cases the defendant could rebut the 
finding of exigent circumstances and remanded the case to the 
Wisconsin courts.
Charges of driving while intoxicated are numerous, so any decision 
regarding BAC testing is important. Such searches comply with 
the Fourth Amendment if a warrant is issued before the test is 
performed, or if the arrestee voluntarily consents to the test.  A BAC 
test is not allowed simply because the person has been lawfully 
arrested, but a breath test may be carried out without a warrant 
allowing it. The tests are allowed without a warrant if there is 
an exigent circumstance, an emergency, or a similar necessary 
situation, including situations in which a police officer is dealing 
with a vehicle accident and, almost 
always, a situation in which the 
condition of the suspect precludes 
carrying out the less intrusive 
breath test. The Court has not 
decided whether the existence of 
an implied consent law makes any 
BAC test reasonable or whether an 
unconscious person has given a 
voluntary consent if, at the time of the test, the person was unable 
to revoke the implied consent to the blood draw.
This term, the Court’s opinions regarding criminal procedure were 
more modest in scope than in recent terms, which applied the 
Fourth Amendment to new technologies and limited the scope of 
the exclusionary rule. Gamble and Flowers received the most media 
attention, but neither made any change in existing legal doctrine. 
Timbs did change the law by holding that the Excessive Fines Clause 
applied to the states, but the decision is not surprising in light of the 
reasoning of McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S.742 (2010), applying the 
second amendment to the states. Similarly, Garza and Mitchell do 
not represent surprising changes from recently decided cases. 
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